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FOR LACK OF A BETTER RULE: USING THE CONCEPT OF
TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY TO SOLVE THE ERIE PROBLEM IN
SHADY GROVE
Stephen R. Brown*
In the 2010 case, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate
Insurance Co., the Supreme Court had to decide whether to apply Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to allow the plaintiff to certify its claim as a
class action or to apply a conflicting state law that precluded class
treatment of the claim. In an opinion that implicated issues related to
class actions, the Erie doctrine, federalism, and the allocation of power
between Congress and the Supreme Court, five Justices held that Federal
Rule 23 should apply. Dissenting with three other Justices, Justice
Ginsburg argued that the Court had sanctioned the plaintiff’s attempt to
“transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award.”
Even the five Justices who agreed that Federal Rule 23 should apply,
however, disagreed about the reasoning. The disagreement primarily
was driven by the relative weight that each Justice assigned to the
competing policy interests at stake—the need for an easily administrable
rule, the need for fidelity to statutory text, and the need for deference to
state legislatures. Shady Grove so fractured the Court that one
commentator has suggested that there is a “need to reconsider the
problem from the ground up.”
In this Article, I argue that the competing policy interests that drove the
disagreement do not actually have to be competing. Here, I propose a
novel solution for deciding whether to apply a Federal Rule or a
conflicting state law. Under this approach, a Federal Rule should trump
a state law only when the conflicting state law is transsubstantive. This
approach resolves the disagreement in Shady Grove because it is easily
administrable, is faithful to the statutory text, and is sufficiently
deferential to state legislatures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Rules Enabling Act, enacted in 1934, vests the Supreme Court
with the authority to promulgate rules of procedure for federal courts,
subject to the limitation that ―[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
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modify any substantive right.‖1 The meaning of this Enabling Act
limitation was the crux of the Supreme Court‘s 2010 case Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.2 There, Shady Grove
sued Allstate and sought class treatment of a claim under New York law
for statutory damages. New York law, however, precluded class
treatment of a claim for statutory damages. The Court, therefore, had to
decide whether allowing Shady Grove‘s claim to proceed as a class
action under Federal Rule 23 in federal court—despite New York‘s
prohibition on class treatment of the claim—would ―abridge, enlarge or
modify‖ a substantive right under New York law.3
This question produced a divided result: five Justices agreed on an
answer—that Federal Rule 23 could apply—but the Court was divided
four to one to four on what test to apply to reach an answer. So, in
2010, over seventy years after Congress first enacted the Enabling Act,
when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must yield to a conflicting state
law is still unsettled.4
The Justices‘ disagreement in Shady Grove is not particularly
surprising. The ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ limitation is one part of
the notoriously difficult5 Erie doctrine—the set of principles governing
the conflict between state law and non-statutory law from federal
sources6 in a federal diversity case.7 But the Justices‘ disagreement has
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
2. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b); Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436–37.
4. See Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie
Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 947 (2011) (―[E]ven after
seventy-plus years, the Court has been unable to come up with definitions of ‗procedural‘ and
‗substantive‘ which predictably resolve that distinction.‖). The Erie decision itself was based, in part,
on ―the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general
law and that of local law.‖ Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
5. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 744 (1980) (―The question whether state or
federal law should apply on various issues arising in an action based on state law which has been
brought in federal court under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction has troubled this Court for many
years.‖); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities
of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 18 (2010) (―Few subjects in the field of Procedure are
characterized by greater legal abstraction than the collection of doctrines that govern the relationship
between the federal and state courts.‖). Professors Burbank and Wolff have persuasively argued that the
―animating concern‖ for the Enabling Act was ―separation of powers.‖ Id. at 27.
6. I use this somewhat clumsy phrase here to avoid characterizing common law announced by
federal judges as federal common law. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts:
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exacerbated the already confused state of the law.8 To borrow an often
used phrase from Erie‘s progeny, the Supreme Court‘s failure to reach a
majority resolution will likely cause ―confusion worse confounded.‖9
There is more at stake in Shady Grove, however, than an academic
debate about Erie. The Court‘s failure to agree on an approach for
resolving the problem in Shady Grove will have important, concrete
effects on the day-to-day practice in federal courts.10 A lack of guidance
on the choice between a state law and a conflicting Federal Rule can
cause a case to turn on what can be fairly characterized as a
technicality.11 For example,12 a litigant may have his otherwise
meritorious claim dismissed as untimely commenced because he
From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove 5–6 (Univ. of Pa. Pub. Law and Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-28 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665092 (noting
the distinction between federal law and ―general law,‖ which ―included most of the classic common law
subjects of tort and contract [and] was not created by any government, but rather deduced by judges‖).
7. Erie, 304 U.S. at 64; 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4501 (2d. ed. 1996) [hereinafter 19 WRIGHT &
MILLER] (―Stated in general terms, the core of the Erie doctrine is that the substantive law to be applied
by the federal courts in any case is state law, except when the matter before the court is governed by the
United States Constitution, an Act of Congress, a treaty, international law, the domestic law of another
country, or, in special circumstances, by federal common law.‖).
8. Professor Jay Tidmarsh has stated that ―Shady Grove‘s fractured opinions suggest the need to
reconsider the [Enabling Act] problem from the ground up.‖ Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and
Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 880 (2011).
9. Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
10. Cf. Bauer, supra note 4, at 22 (―[U]niformity helps the parties, attorneys and judges know
what the rules are. Uniformity in turn also leads to greater ease of administration of the judicial process;
federal courts will have to look to fewer sources for resolving controversial issues, and they will be
sources with which the courts are more familiar.‖).
11. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 711 (1974) (―[W]e
can all agree that a situation where a person cannot predict or control where he will be sued, and will
lose in one court if he does X and lose in the other if he doesn‘t, is one we should certainly try to
avoid.‖).
12. Cf. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 742–44 (1980). In Walker, less than two
years after an injury allegedly caused by the defendant‘s negligent manufacture of a nail, the plaintiff
filed a suit in federal district court in Oklahoma. Id. The summons, however, was not served on the
defendant until about two years and three months after the injury. Id. Oklahoma‘s statute of limitations
required a plaintiff to ―commence[]‖ an action within two years of the injury. Under Federal Rule 3, an
action was ―commenced by filing a complaint with the court.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 3. Under Oklahoma law,
however, an action is not ―commenced‖ until ―service of the summons on the defendant.‖ Walker, 446
U.S. at 742. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff‘s suit must be dismissed because of his failure to
serve the summons on the defendant within the time required by Oklahoma law, despite his
―commenc[ing]‖ under Federal Rule 3 within two years of the injury. Id. at 751–53.
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followed the Federal Rule (defining commencement as when a
complaint is filed) instead of a state law (defining commencement as
when a defendant is served).13
This Article will argue that the fractured result in Shady Grove was
primarily driven by the relative weight that the Justices assigned to the
competing policy interests underlying the choice between state law and
non-statutory law from federal sources. Justice Scalia (writing for a
plurality of four justices) stated that a Federal Rule must govern—
regardless of the nature of the conflicting state law—when the Federal
Rule ―really regulates procedure.‖14 This approach, according to Justice
Scalia, was easy to apply and avoided the complicated issue of assessing
the purpose of a conflicting state law.15 Justice Stevens (writing for
himself and concurring in the judgment) argued that the Federal Rule
should usually govern unless the state rule is ―so intertwined with a state
right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created
right.‖16 Justice Stevens preferred this approach for its fidelity to the
language of the Enabling Act.17 Finally, Justice Ginsburg (dissenting
with the support of three other Justices) argued that a court should,
whenever possible, interpret the Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with an
―important‖ state law.18 This approach deferred to the judgments made
by state legislatures consistent with the principles of federalism.19
13. The obvious response to this objection is that a litigant can simply comply with the more
demanding rule. Cf. Ely, supra note 11, at 711. One point made in support of the Erie doctrine
generally is that it avoids ―a situation where a person cannot predict or control where he will be sued,
and will lose in one court if he does X and lose in the other if he doesn‘t.‖ Id. Professor Ely undercuts
this justification—with a point that is equally applicable to uncertainty about whether a state law or a
Federal Rule will govern in federal court—by claiming that ―in every case compliance with the other
rule would have constituted compliance with both.‖ Id.
14. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1445 (2010) (quoting
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14).
15. Id. at 1447 n.15 (arguing that an ―inquiry into the ‗nature and functions‘ of a state law will
tend to increase, rather than decrease, the difficulty of classifying Federal Rules as substantive or
procedural‖).
16. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 1454 (criticizing the plurality for ―adopt[ing] a second-best interpretation of the Rules
Enabling Act . . . in the service of simplicity‖).
18. Id. at 1449 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)) (―[F]ederal rules must be interpreted with some degree of ‗sensitivity to
important state interests and regulatory policies‘ . . . .‖).
19. Id. at 1473 (criticizing the Court for its ―erosion of Erie‘s federalism grounding‖).
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This was not an intractable20 disagreement about the meaning of
precedent.21 Rather, the disagreement—along with the resulting
difficulties it will cause for lower courts and litigants—exists only for
lack of a better rule.
This Article proposes a new approach that, by accommodating the
competing policy interests at stake, can potentially serve as that better
rule and provide much-needed clarity. Briefly, when faced with a
choice between a Federal Rule and a conflicting22 state law, a federal
court sitting in diversity should apply the Federal Rule when the state
rule is transsubstantive.23 Conversely, when the state law is not

20. Others have pointed out that the disagreement between the Justices may not have been as
severe as it appeared. See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1173 (2011) (arguing that ―some areas
of the purported disagreement between Scalia an Stevens may be more semantic than substantive‖).
21. It must be noted that Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens engage in a debate over the meaning
of the Sibbach case, a 1941 Supreme Court precedent on the meaning of Enabling Act. See Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444–47 (Justice Scalia arguing that the Enabling Act only requires a court to
determine whether the Federal Rule at issue is procedural); id. at 1454–55 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Enabling Act requires a court to also examine whether the state law to be trumped by
the Federal Rule is substantive). Justice Scalia, however, acknowledges that his approach ―is hard to
square with [the Enabling Act]‘s terms‖ and to an extent concedes that ―[t]here is something to [Justice
Stevens‘s approach].‖ Id. at 1445–46 (plurality opinion). So, although this disagreement exists, the
disagreement appears to be driven by policy concerns. For an excellent discussion of the debate over
Sibbach, see Allen Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure:
The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens (Loyola–LA Legal Studies Paper No.
2010-36). As this debate has been substantially covered elsewhere, this Article is written under the
assumption that Justice Scalia‘s really regulates procedure approach was not compelled or mandated by
Sibbach.
22. Justice Ginsburg, writing in a dissent joined by three others, argued that there was, in fact, no
conflict between the state rule and the Federal Rule. This Article will generally assume that a majority
of the court was correct in holding that there was in fact a conflict between New York‘s Rule 23 and
Federal Rule 23. Justice Ginsburg correctly points out that her approach to the Shady Grove case would
give greater respect to principles of federalism, but her approach also causes uncertainly for litigants—
courts have applied the accommodation approach that she suggests with inconsistency. See Richard D.
Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The Irrepressible Influence of Byrd, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61, 70 (2010)
(―Through the years, the court has been anything but consistent in its approach to the important
funneling function of assessing the breadth of a Federal Rule.‖). This Article will show, however, that
the state-law transsubstantivity approach proffered here will adequately respect principles of federalism
without sacrificing certainty. See infra Part III.C. This new approach is directed at solving the specific
problem at issue in Shady Grove—when the Enabling Act‘s abridge, enlarge or modify limitation
requires a Federal Rule to yield to a conflicting state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
23. For an interesting discussion on the history and development of transsubstantive procedure,
see David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59
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transsubstantive, the federal court should apply the state law. As will be
explained further below, this transsubstantivity-based approach (1) will
not be materially more difficult to apply that Justice Scalia‘s really
regulates procedure test, (2) is faithful to the text of the Enabling Act,
and (3) is respectful of the judgments of state legislatures.
In Part II, this Article will begin by describing how the Supreme
Court, prior to Shady Grove, approached conflicts between non-statutory
federal law and state law. Part II will also describe the important cases
on the specific conflict between a Federal Rule and a state law. In Part
III, this Article will discuss the Shady Grove opinion in detail,
highlighting how policy preferences had an effect on the three separate
opinions. Part IV will describe the state-law transsubstantivity approach
and discuss how it will better accommodate the various policy issues
that produced the Court‘s fractured result in Shady Grove. Throughout
Part IV, this Article will attempt to confront arguments that can be made
against the state-law transsubstantivity approach. In Part V, this Article
will use two examples to describe how the state-law transsubstantivity
approach would apply in practice. Part VI briefly concludes.
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATUTORY FEDERAL LAW
For any diversity-of-citizenship case in federal court, when there is a
conflict between state law and non-statutory law from federal sources,
the general rule is that ―federal courts are to apply state substantive law
and federal procedural law.‖24 Although this broad principle applies to
all conflicts between state law and non-statutory law from federal
sources, the precise analytical framework under which the conflict is
resolved depends on the type of non-statutory law.25
A conflict between state law and non-statutory federal law as
expounded by federal judges must be resolved under the framework

DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010).
24. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
25. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466–69; see also Ely, supra note 11, at 699 (―For whatever Hanna‘s
other merits or demerits, the major point of the Court‘s opinion was its separation for purposes of
analysis the Rules of Decision Act, the Enabling Act, and the constitutional demands to which the Erie
opinion had alluded.‖).
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announced in the Erie case.26 A conflict between a state law and a
Federal Rule, on the other hand, must be resolved under the Enabling
Act.27 The Erie framework is more flexible and allows a court to focus
on the fairness of applying one of the two conflicting laws.28
Conversely, the Enabling Act analysis more rigidly depends on the
categorization of conflicting laws as substantive or procedural.29 To
avoid this rigidity, courts have sometimes interpreted the scope of a
Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with state law.30 With the scope of the
Federal Rule thus limited, the extant conflict is then between state law
and non-statutory federal law as expounded by federal judges and,
therefore, is governed by the more flexible Erie analysis.31
26. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938). Tompkins sued in federal court and
claimed that the Erie Railroad Company‘s negligence caused his injuries. Relevant to Tompkins claim,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that (1) an individual walking along railroad tracks was a
trespasser and (2) that a railroad ―[wa]s not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from
its negligence, unless it be wanton or willful.‖ Id. at 70. The federal trial court adjudicating Tompkins
claim, however, declined to apply the rule announced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and did not
require wanton or willful negligence.
27. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466–69.
28. See id. at 467 (―The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the
character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in federal
court.‖); see also Ely, supra note 11, at 712 (―The Court was referring to the unfairness of affording a
nonresident plaintiff suing a resident defendant a unilateral choice of the rules by which the lawsuit was
to be determined.‖); id. (noting ―[T]he unfairness of subjecting a person involved in litigation with a
citizen of a different state to a body of law different from that which applies when his next door
neighbor is involved in similar litigation with a cocitizen.‖).
29. If one accepts Justice Scalia‘s reading of the Sibbach case in Shady Grove, one can also say
that the Enabling Act analysis is more rigid because it does not allow for the consideration of state law
that is to be displaced—i.e., once a court determines that a Federal Rule is procedural, the Federal Rule
automatically trumps the conflicting state law. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (―In sum, it is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose of
the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule.‖).
30. See Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (reasoning that its
adopted interpretation of Federal Rule 41(b) was supported by the fact that a contrary interpretation
―would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rule Enabling Act‖); Shady Grove, 130 S.
Ct. at 1462 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―[W]e have avoided immoderate interpretations of the Federal
Rules that would trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest.‖); see
also Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 112 (discussing Walker and noting that ―[T]he Court pretty
clearly applied a substantive canon of construction: if possible, read Federal Rules narrowly to avoid
trenching on state substantive interests and thus avoid raising serious issues under § 2072(b).‖).
31. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―And absent a governing
federal rule, a federal court must engage in the traditional Rules of Decision Act inquiry, under the Erie
line of cases.‖); see id. at 1460–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence
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Thus, understanding Shady Grove, which involved a potential conflict
between a state law and Federal Rule 23, requires an understanding of
three lines of cases: (1) Erie and its progeny, (2) cases construing the
Enabling Act, and (3) cases where a Federal Rule was interpreted to
avoid a conflict with state law.
A. The Rules of Decision Act and Erie
A conflict between state law and non-statutory federal law as
expounded by federal judges must be resolved under the framework
announced in Erie.32 Erie centered around the Rules of Decision Act,
first enacted in 1789,33 which directs that federal courts must apply state
―law‖ unless a federal law ―shall otherwise require or provide.‖34 Prior
to Erie, it had been held that a common law rule announced by a state‘s
supreme court was not a ―law‖ within the meaning of the Rules of
Decision Act35; therefore, ―federal courts [we]re free, in the absence of a
on ―avoid[ing] immoderate interpretation of the Federal Rules‖ so that Erie will control‖); see also 19
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4508 (―If the federal rule does not control the point in dispute, and
thus there is no conflict between state law and the federal rule, the court must apply the federal rule
within its sphere of coverage, and determine whether to apply the state law to the point in dispute in
light of the twin aims of Erie.‖).
32. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938). In Erie, the plaintiff Tompkins had been
walking at night on a ―much used‖ path that ran parallel to railroad tracks in Pennsylvania. As he was
walking, a freight train owned by the Erie Railroad Company came toward him. The train used its
whistle and headlight to alert Tompkins of its approach but Tompkins did not move off of the path.
When the train passed, Tompkins was struck and injured by an ―open door swinging from the side of a
car.‖ Id. at 80–81. Tompkins sued in federal court and claimed that the Erie Railroad Company‘s
negligence caused his injuries.
33. See 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4502 (noting that the Rules of Decision Act was
―amended slightly in 1948‖ but ―has remained substantially unchanged‖ from its initial 1789 form).
34. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842). The Rules of Decision Act states that ―the laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
35. In interpreting the Rules of Decision Act, the Supreme Court in Swift, 41 U.S. at 18, held that
―the decisions of the local tribunals‖ were not ―law‖ ―[i]n the ordinary use of language.‖ Wright &
Miller notes that the ―unarticulated assumption of Swift [is that] the federal judiciary has the power,
indeed perhaps the duty, to reach the result that appears to it as just, regardless of what the states may
regard as the proper outcome.‖ 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4502. For a thorough and
informative discussion of the Swift case and how the holding in Swift expanded until Erie, see Bradford
R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1289 (2007).
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local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law
[wa]s.‖36
In Erie, the Supreme Court overruled this earlier precedent and held
that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply a common law rule
announced by a state‘s supreme court.37 The Erie Court supported its
holding by identifying two problematic results that flowed from a failure
to apply a state common law rule. First, the Court noted that the failure
to apply state common law had encouraged forum shopping.38 Because
the outcome of a case could differ in federal court and state court, a
party could select the most favorable forum. The Court cited one
particularly egregious example, where, in anticipation of lawsuit, a
corporation had re-incorporated under the law of another state to
manufacture diversity jurisdiction to take advantage of the more
favorable law applied in federal court.39
Second, the Court concluded, albeit somewhat cryptically, that the
failure to apply state common law had ―rendered impossible equal
protection of the law‖ and had ―prevented uniformity in the
administration of the law of the State.‖40 Essentially, because the
―privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be determined
was conferred upon the non-citizen,‖ the non-citizen in litigation had an
advantage over a citizen.41 Congress intended diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction to ―prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts
against those not citizens of the State.‖42 So while diversity jurisdiction
36. Erie, 304 U.S. at 70 (quoting 90 F.2d 603, 604). Prior to Erie, Justice Field criticized this
approach, suggesting that ―what has been termed the general law of the country [] is often little less than
what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the general law on a particular
subject.‖ Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
37. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80. The Erie case focused on the language of the Rules of Decision
Act. But the Court also held—in a passage about which commentators still debate today—that the
Constitution compelled the interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act expounded in Erie. According to
the Court, when a federal court sitting in diversity failed to apply a rule announced by a state‘s supreme
court, the federal court ―invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.‖
Id. at 80–81.
38. Id. at 73–74.
39. Id. (citing Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928)).
40. Id. at 75.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 74.
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was meant to level the playing field for non-citizens, before Erie,
diversity jurisdiction had tipped the scales in favor of non-citizens.43
These two problematic results were later characterized by the Supreme
Court as ―the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.‖44
Separate from these ―twin aims,‖ the Court also reasoned that the
practice of allowing federal courts to announce and apply general
common law had ―invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the
Constitution to the several states.‖45 This constitutional aspect of the
Erie decision ―rests on the principle that the federal government as a
whole, including Congress and the federal courts, has no more authority
than that given it by the Constitution.‖46
A later case sharpened the focus on the twin aims and suggested the
rule that, in a diversity case, if application of federal common law over a
conflicting state law will implicate these twin aims, Erie and its progeny
require a court to apply the state law.47 At bottom, Erie and its twin
aims require application of state law when application of the conflicting
federal law would be ―unfair[].‖48
B. The Rules Enabling Act
The framework announced in Erie was intended to resolve a conflict

43. See id. (―Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens.‖).
44. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415, 426–28 (1996) (describing the Erie rule).
45. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80; see also 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4505 (―Perhaps no
aspect of the Erie decision has perplexed the commentators as much as this statement.‖); Clark, supra
note 35 (exploring the constitutional underpinnings of the Erie case).
46. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4505.
47. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9 (noting that a court should apply a conflicting state law when
―application of the [state] rule would make so important a difference to the character or result of the
litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or
whether application of the rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the
litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court‖).
48. Ely, supra note 11, at 712 (―The Court was referring to the unfairness of affording a
nonresident plaintiff suing a resident defendant a unilateral choice of the rules by which the lawsuit was
to be determined.‖); id. (noting ―[T]he unfairness of subjecting a person involved in litigation with a
citizen of a different state to a body of law different from that which applies when his next door
neighbor is involved in similar litigation with a cocitizen.‖).
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between a state law and non-statutory common law announced by
federal judges. The Federal Rules are similarly non-statutory law from a
federal source. In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress vested in the
Supreme Court the authority to promulgate ―general rules of practice
and procedure‖ to govern in federal courts.49 After the Supreme Court
has proposed a Rule, the Rule is submitted to Congress for approval.50
Because of this process, the Supreme Court has treated the Federal
Rules differently than the law at issue in Erie.51
1. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.
The earliest relevant Supreme Court decision on the meaning of the
Enabling Act is Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.52 There, Sibbach was injured
in a car accident in Indiana.53 She sued in the Northern District of
Illinois to recover for injuries.54 Wilson & Co. sought to require
Sibbach to undergo a physical examination under the then newly
promulgated Federal Rule 35,55 which first came into effect after
Sibbach filed her suit.56
To avoid undergoing the physical examination, Sibbach argued that
Federal Rule 35 violated the Enabling Act‘s ―abridge, enlarge or
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
50. For a complete (and interesting) discussion of the rulemaking process, see Catherine T.
Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1099, 1103–19 (2002).
51. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1964) (―[T]he court has been instructed to apply
the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress
erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.‖).
52. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
53. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 108 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1939); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6.
54. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6.
55. Id. At the time, Federal Rule 35 allowed a district court to order a physical examination in
an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, but Federal Rule
37(b)(2)(iv) ―exempt[ed] from punishment as for contempt the refusal to obey an order that a party
submit to a physical or mental examination.‖ Id. at 16. Despite this explicit exception, the district court
had held Sibbach in contempt for refusing to submit to the ordered physical examination. Id. Although
the Court rejected Sibbach‘s central argument that Rules 35 and 37 violated the Enabling Act, the Court
reversed the contempt sanction. Id.
56. Ides, supra note 21, at 8 (―When Sibbach filed her suit, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
had yet to go into effect.‖).
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modify‖ limitation.57 Importantly, under the most plausible reading,58
Sibbach did not argue that a court order compelling a physical
examination affected her substantive59 rights (e.g., the right to be free
from personal ―invasion‖60). Instead she argued that the Enabling Act‘s
―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ limitation was meant to prevent the Rules
from affecting ―important‖ or ―substantial‖ rights.61 This convoluted
argument—essentially that substantive meant something other than
substantive—reflected the thorny procedural posture of the case.62
The Supreme Court rejected Sibbach‘s interpretation of
―substantive.‖ According to the Court, ―substantial‖ and ―important‖
were too difficult to define: ―If we were to adopt the suggested criterion
of the importance of the alleged right we should invite endless litigation
and confusion worse confounded.‖63 Relevant here, the Court noted that
the supposedly ―substantial‖ and ―important‖ right that Sibbach sought
to protect was not universally recognized, noting that ―state courts are
divided as to the power in the absence of a statute to order a physical
examination.‖64
Instead, the Court held that ―the test‖ for whether a Federal Rule
violates the Enabling Act ―must be whether a rule really regulates
procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them.‖65 Rule 35 was valid, the
Court held, because it was procedural.66 The Supreme Court did not
57. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9 (―The contention of [Sibbach], in final analysis, is that Rule[]
35 . . . [is] not within the mandate of Congress to this court.‖).
58. See supra, note 21.
59. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11 (―[Plaintiff] admits, and, we think, correctly, that Rules 35 and 37
are rules of procedure.‖).
60. Id. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (―I deem a requirement as to the invasion of the person
to stand on a very different footing from questions pertaining to the discovery of documents, pre-trial
procedure and other devises for the expeditious, economic and fair conduct of litigation.‖).
61. Id. at 11 (majority opinion).
62. Professor Allan Ides provides an excellent explanation of this procedural posture in his 2010
article on Shady Grove. Ides, supra note 21, at 7–10.
63. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Untangled from the procedural posture of the case, Justice Frankfurter in dissent made a
compelling argument that Rules 35 and 37 did in fact exceed the scope of the Supreme Court‘s authority
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address whether application of the Rule 35 would affect Sibbach‘s
substantive rights as Sibbach did not make this argument.67
2. Hanna v. Plumer
The Supreme Court‘s next important decision on the Enabling Act
was Hanna v. Plumer.68 There, the plaintiff, Eddie V. Hanna, was
injured in automobile accident that occurred in South Carolina.69 She
alleged that Louise Plumer Osgood was liable for her injuries. Osgood
had died after the automobile accident, but before Hanna filed her suit,
so Hanna sued the executor of Osgood‘s estate, Edward M. Plumer.
Plumer was purportedly served with notice of the lawsuit when copies
of the summons and the complaint were left at his home with his wife.70
This method of service was proper under Federal Rule of Civil

to promulgate rules of practice and procedure. Id. at 16–17 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter
argued that at stake was the ―inviolability of a person.‖ Id. Instead of focusing on the ―abridge, enlarge
or modify‖ limitation, Justice Frankfurter argued:
So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy in a matter deeply touching
the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a
general authorization to formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business
on the civil side of the federal courts.
Id. at 18. Essentially, Justice Frankfurter argued that, regardless of the label attached to Rules 35 and
37, the Rules affected an important right. This is something akin to a separation-of-powers argument—
Congress, rather than the Court, should be decided an issue this important. Cf. Indus. Union Dep't AFLCIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (―This uncertainty, I
would suggest, is eminently justified, since I believe that this litigation presents the Court with what has
to be one of the most difficult issues that could confront a decisionmaker: whether the statistical
possibility of future deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of preventing those
deaths. I would also suggest that the widely varying positions advanced in the briefs of the parties and
in the opinions of Mr. Justice Stevens, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Marshall
demonstrate, perhaps better than any other fact, that Congress, the governmental body best suited and
most obligated to make the choice confronting us in this litigation, has improperly delegated that choice
to the Secretary of Labor and, derivatively, to this Court.‖).
67. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. Sibbach‘s admission that Rules 35 and 37 were procedural
foreclosed any argument under this test: ―[t]hat the rules in question are such is admitted.‖ Id.
Professor Ely later suggested that the Supreme Court‘s Sibbach analysis was driven by the
―comparatively primitive state of the Court‘s thinking, circa 1941.‖ Ely, supra note 11, at 735. ―[B]y
[the Court‘s] lights, either a Rule was procedural or it affected substantive rights.‖ Id. at 719.
68. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
69. Id. at 461.
70. Id.
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Procedure 4(d)(1).71 But Massachusetts General Laws ch. 197, § 9
required a plaintiff to serve an executor or administrator ―in hand.‖72
Arguing that the service was improper under Massachusetts law,
Plumer moved to dismiss the lawsuit. The district court granted
Plumer‘s motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed, holding
that ―relatively recent amendments to [the state service of process
statute] evince a clear legislative purpose to require personal
notification.‖73
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that in-hand service
was not required. The Court stated that Federal Rule 4(d)(1) ―relate[d]
to ‗practice and procedure of the district courts‘‖74 because it
―[p]rescrib[ed] the manner in which a defendant is to be notified that a
suit has been instituted against him.‖75 The Court quoted the Sibbach
language on the validity of a Federal Rule—―‗whether a rule really
regulates procedure‘‖76—and held that Federal Rule 4(d)(1) ―clearly
passe[d] muster.‖77 The analysis in Hanna shed little light on the
meaning of the Enabling Act.
The Hanna opinion is important, however, for making clear that the
Enabling Act analysis is different than the Erie analysis and that the Erie
analysis was not ―the appropriate test of the validity and therefore the

71. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1) (―The summons and complaint shall be served together.
The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be
made as follows: (1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein . . . .‖).
72. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958) (―Except as provided in this chapter, an
executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is
not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to
such an action which is commenced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such
action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or service thereof
accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the creditor, the
amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper
registry of probate.‖).
73. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462.
74. Id. at 464.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
77. Id.
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applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.‖ 78 A Federal Rule
was different than non-statutory federal law as expounded by federal
judges, according to the Hanna Court, because the Advisory Committee,
the Supreme Court, and Congress had all made a judgment on the
validity of a Federal Rule before it would become effective.79
So after Hanna, it was clear that Erie did not govern a conflict
between a state law and a Federal Rule. Less clear, however, was the
meaning of the ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ limitation of the Enabling
Act.
C. Avoiding a Potential Conflict Between State Law and a Federal Rule
One consequence of the Enabling Act‘s language is that the conflict
between state law and a Federal Rule is resolved by classification of a
law as substantive or procedural. This precludes a court from
accounting for the fairness considerations that underlie Erie‘s twin aims.
To avoid the more rigid Enabling Act analysis, courts have at times
interpreted the Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with state law.80 If there
is no Federal Rule covering the matter in dispute, then any conflict is
governed by the more flexible Erie analysis. The Supreme Court has
followed this approach in two important cases following Hanna.
1. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., the Court analyzed whether a conflict
78. Id. at 469–70.
79. Id. at 471 (―[T]he question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided
Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the
Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.‖).
80. See, e.g., Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001). But see
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) (―This is not to suggest that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‗direct collision‘ with state
law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises
from that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.‖); Burlington N. R.R.
Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (finding a conflict, in part, because ―[T]he purposes underlying the
Rule are sufficiently coextensive with the asserted purposes of the Alabama statute to indicate that the
Rule occupies the statute's field of operation so as to preclude its application in federal diversity
actions.‖).
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existed between a state law and a Federal Rule that both addressed when
an action was ―commenced.‖81 This conflict was important because the
relevant statute of limitations in Walker required a plaintiff to
―commence[]‖ an action within two years of an injury.
In this case, Fred N. Walker injured his eye when pieces of a nail he
had hammered flew up into his face. Walker alleged that the nail
shattered because it was defectively manufactured by defendant, Armco
Steel.82 Under Oklahoma law, Walker‘s suit was ―governed by a 2-year
statute of limitations period.‖83 Walker filed his complaint and a
summons was issued within two years of the accident.84 Importantly,
however, merely filing an action did not satisfy the Oklahoma statute of
limitations; rather, the statute of limitations was only satisfied after an
action was ―commenced.‖85 Relevant here,86 the Oklahoma law stated
that an action was not deemed ―commenced‖ for the purposes of the
statute of limitations until the defendant was actually served: ―‗An
action shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this article
[the statute of limitations] . . . at the date of the summons which is
served . . . .‘‖87 Armco Steel was not served until more than two years
after the accident.88 Walker admitted that he had not timely commenced
the action under Oklahoma law.89
Walker argued instead that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—and
not Oklahoma law—should govern when an action is commenced.90
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, ―‗[a] civil action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the court.‘‖91 Walker had filed
81. Walker, 446 U.S. at 742–43.
82. Id. at 741.
83. Id. at 742 n.3.
84. Id. at 742.
85. Id. at 742–43.
86. The Oklahoma statute of limitations also provided an exception to this general rule that
commencement only occurred upon service on the defendant. The action as deemed to have been
commenced on the date of filing for the purposes of the statute of limitations if service was made on the
defendant within sixty days of service. Id. at 743. Walker, however, did not comply with either the
general rule or the exception. See id. at 742–43.
87. Id. at 743 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, § 97 (1971)).
88. Id. at 742.
89. Id. at 743.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 750 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 3).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

18

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

his action within two years of his injury, and if Federal Rule 3 governed
when an action was ―commenced,‖ Walker would have satisfied the
applicable Oklahoma statute of limitations.92
Although both rules seemed to govern when an action was
―commenced,‖ the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule 3 and the
Oklahoma law were not in conflict.93 The Court reasoned that Federal
Rule 3 was not intended to have an effect on state statutes of limitations.
Instead, Federal Rule 3 was intended to start the clock on various
deadlines under the Federal Rules.94 In contrast, the Oklahoma law was
a ―statement of a substantive decision by that State that actual service
on, and accordingly actual notice by, the defendant is an integral part of
the several policies served by the statute of limitations.‖ 95
Because Federal Rule 3 did not replace the policy determinations in
the Oklahoma statute, the Court held that the two rules could ―exist side
by side[:] each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without
conflict.‖96 The lack of a conflict dictated that case was governed by the
Erie analysis. Acknowledging that application of Federal Rule 3 ―might
not create any problem of forum shopping,‖ the Court nonetheless held
that the Oklahoma rule should apply:
There is simply no reason why, in the absence of a controlling federal
rule, an action based on state law which concededly would be barred in
the state courts by the state statute of limitations should proceed through
litigation to judgment in federal court solely because of the fortuity that
there is diversity of citizenship between the litigants.97

Arguably, however, Federal Rule 3 should have controlled when the
action was ―commenced‖ for all purposes in federal court.98 Federal
92. See id. at 742–43.
93. Id. at 750.
94. Id. at 750–51 (internal footnotes and citations omitted) (―There is no indication that the Rule
was intended to toll a state statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling
rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations. In our view, in diversity actions Rule 3 governs the
date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state
statutes of limitations.‖).
95. Id. at 751.
96. Id. at 752.
97. Id. at 753.
98. Others have also noted that Federal Rule does address tolling in federal question cases. See
Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 72 (citing West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987)).
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Rule 3 applies to ―all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
district courts.‖99 In stating the test for determining whether a conflict
existed, the Court seemed to put a thumb on the no-conflict side of the
scale—―[t]he . . . question must . . . be whether the scope of the Federal
Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the
Court.‖100 In a footnote, however, the Court claimed that it was not
―suggest[ing] that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be
narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‗direct collision‘ with state
law.‖101
2. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities
Following the Walker case, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc., the Supreme Court expressly recognized the practice of
―interpret[ing] the federal rules to avoid conflict with important state
regulatory policies.‖102
There, William Gasperini had taken photographs in Central America
as a journalist, and had lent 300 of the original color transparencies of
the photographs to the Center for Humanities.103 The Center used the
transparencies to make an educational video about conflict in Central
America.104 When Gasperini asked for the transparencies back, the
Center for Humanities could not locate them.105 Gasperini sued and was
awarded $450,000 in compensatory damages, or $1,500 for each of the
transparencies.106
The Center for Humanities argued that this verdict should be

99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
100. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 749–50. Discussing the Walker case, Freer and Arthur observe that,
―even though unwilling to own up to it, the court pretty clearly applied a substantive canon of
construction: if possible, read Federal Rules narrowly to avoid trenching on state substantive interest
and thus avoid raising serious issues under § 2072(b).‖ Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 72.
101. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9.
102. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996) (citations and internal
quotations marks omitted).
103. Id. at 419.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 420.
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overturned because it was excessive.107 Under a New York law, a judge
had authority to overturn a jury verdict that ―deviate[d] materially from
what would be reasonable compensation.‖108 Prior to the enactment of
New York‘s ―deviates materially‖ statute, federal courts had recognized
a judge‘s power to overturn a jury‘s verdict under Federal Rule 59.109
Under Federal Rule 59, a judge had authority to overturn a jury verdict
when ―it [wa]s quite clear that the jury ha[d] reached a seriously
erroneous result [and] letting the verdict stand would result in a
miscarriage of justice.‖110
The Court held that these two standards were not in conflict, stating
that, ―[w]hether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be
governed by some law [a]nd there is no candidate for that governance
other than the law that gives rise to the claim for relief—here, the law of
New York.‖111 The Court supported this interpretation by citing to
authority stating that the ―Court ‗ha[d] continued since [Hanna] to
interpret the federal rules to avoid conflict with important state
regulatory policies.‘‖112
Under the Court‘s interpretation, the deviates materially statute did
not conflict with Federal Rule 59; instead, the statute conflicted with the
non-statutory federal law standard for granting a new trial. The Court,
therefore, applied the Erie analysis and concluded that the federal
district court was required to use the New York State‘s ―deviates
materially‖ standard.113
To summarize, before Shady Grove, there were three relevant lines of
cases on the conflict between non-statutory federal law and state law:
107. Id.
108. Id. at 423–24. This statute was apparently motivated by runaway juries. See Bauer, supra
note 4, at 26 (―There was considerable evidence that this statute had been adopted in response to
perceived excessive verdicts by ‗runaway‘ juries.‖).
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a) (―The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the
issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action
at law in federal court.‖); see Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing federal
practice under Federal Rule 59).
110. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see id. at 437 n.22 (majority
opinion).
111. Id. at 437 n.22 (majority opinion).
112. Id. (quoting R. FALLON, D. MELTZER, & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 729–30 (4th ed. 1996)).
113. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 439.
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(1) Erie and its progeny, which required a court to resolve a conflict
between federal common law and state law through consideration of
Erie‘s twin aims; (2) Sibbach and its progeny, which offered a really
regulates procedure test—and almost nothing else—to resolve a conflict
between a Federal Rule and a conflicting state law; and (3) Walker and
Gasperini, which acknowledged the practice of interpreting a Federal
Rule to avoid a conflict with important state policies.
III. SHADY GROVE
A. Background of Shady Grove
Coincidentally, like the important Enabling Act cases that preceded it,
Shady Grove involved an automobile accident.114 Sonia E. Galvez
suffered injuries in that automobile accident and then received medical
treatment from Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates.115 Galvez had an
insurance policy with the Allstate Insurance Co. to cover the care that
Shady Grove provided.116
Under New York law, an insurance company like Allstate had 30
days from the treatment to pay Shady Grove. 117 If an insurance
company missed this deadline, it was required to pay 2% interest per
month on the late payments. Allstate did pay Shady Grove, but Allstate
paid late and did not pay the 2% interest.118
Shady Grove brought suit in federal district court in New York to
collect the statutory interest. In addition to the facts outlined above,
Shady Grove also alleged that ―Allstate routinely refuse[d] to pay
interest on overdue benefits.‖119 Shady Grove, therefore, sought to act
as a class representative for all others that Allstate failed to pay the
statutory interest to.120
114. Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
115. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010).
116. Id. As partial compensation for the medical treatment, Galvez gave her rights to insurance
benefits under a policy she had with Allstate. Id.
117. Id. at 1436–37.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Allstate sought to dismiss Shady Grove‘s class action claim, arguing
that New York Civil Practice Law § 901(b) prohibited class treatment.121
Section 901(b) ―prohibit[ed] class actions in suits seeking penalties or
statutory minimum damages.‖122 The interest on the unpaid insurance
payments that Shady Grove sought to recover was a penalty or statutory
minimum under § 901(b).123 In a New York state court, then, § 901(b)
would have precluded class treatment of Shady Grove‘s claim.124
Shady Grove, however, argued that § 901(b)‘s limitation did not
apply to its claim. Rather, because Shady Grove had sued in federal
court, Federal Rule 23 governed whether it could maintain a class
action. Unlike New York‘s § 901(b), Federal Rule 23 contained no
limitation on class actions that sought a penalty or statutory interest.125
Arguably, then, Federal Rule 23 allowed class treatment of Shady
Grove‘s claim. Allstate responded that application of Federal Rule 23
instead of New York‘s § 901(b) would abridge, enlarge, or modify
Allstate‘s substantive rights in violation of the Enabling Act.126
To resolve whether New York‘s § 901(b) or Federal Rule 23
governed, the Supreme Court had to decide (1) whether § 901(b) and
Federal Rule 23 were in conflict; and, if so, (2) how the ―abridge,
enlarge or modify‖ limitation actually limited the Supreme Court‘s
121. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2008).
The procedural posture of the case requires a brief explanation. Shady Grove brought its claim in
federal district court as a class action. Shady Grove‘s complaint raised no federal question and, on its
own, Shady Grove‘s claim did not meet 28 U.S.C. § 1332‘s jurisdictional minimum of $75,000 in
controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). Instead, Shady Grove invoked jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act: ―[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a
class action in which . . . any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). If Allstate could show that Shady Grove‘s claim could not be
brought as a class action, then the federal court would be required to dismiss the claim for lack of
jurisdiction.
122. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.
123. See id. at 1437.
124. See id. (noting that federal district court had ―[c]onclud[ed] that statutory interest [wa]s a
‗penalty‘ under New York law, [and] held that § 901(b) prohibited the proposed class action‖).
125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
126. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 31, Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008)) (noting that Allstate
argued that application of Rule 23 over § 901(b) was not ―substantively neutral‖ and would abridge the
―‗substantive right . . . not to be subjected to aggregated class-action liability‖ in a single suit‖).
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rulemaking authority.
B. The “Really Regulates Procedure” Approach
To answer whether Federal Rule 23 and § 901(b) were in conflict,
Justice Scalia focused on the ―question in dispute‖127—―whether Shady
Grove‘s suit may proceed as a class action.‖128 Rule 23 answered that
question: ―By its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a
plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a
class action.‖129 Section 901(b) also answered ―the same question.‖130
The two, therefore, were in conflict,131 and no reasonable interpretation
of Federal Rule 23 could avoid the conflict.132 This conflict required the
court to ―confront head-on whether Rule 23 f[ell] within [the Enabling
Act‘s] statutory authorization.‖133
As stated above, the Enabling Act vested the Supreme Court with
authority to promulgate rules of procedure (subject to congressional
approval) ―but with the limitation that those rules ‗shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.‘‖134 Justice Scalia, following
Sibbach, stated that ―this limitation means that the Rule must ‗really
regulate[] procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.‘‖135 The Federal
Rule, Justice Scalia argued, must control if it ―governs . . . ‗the manner
and the means‘ by which the litigants‘ rights are ‗enforced.‘‖136
Importantly, this approach did not leave any room for consideration of
the displaced state law: the ―substantive nature‖ or ―substantive
purpose‖ of the state rule that the Federal Rule will displace ―makes no

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1437.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1441 (―[E]ven artificial narrowing cannot render § 901(b) compatible with Rule 23.‖).
Id. at 1442.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006)).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
Id. at 1442 (quoting Miss. Publ‘g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)).
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difference.‖137
Justice Scalia acknowledged that his approach was ―hard to square
with [the Enabling Act‘s] terms.‖138 Said another way, he concluded
that ―it is hard to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal
Rule ‗abridges‘ or ‗modifies‘ substantive rights without knowing what
state-created rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not exist.‖139
Although, potentially inconsistent with the language of the Enabling
Act, Justice Scalia argued that his approach was ―driven by the very real
concern that Federal Rules which vary from State to State would be
chaos.‖140
C. The “Intertwined” Approach
Writing separately in a concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed with
much of Justice Scalia‘s opinion. To start, he agreed with Justice Scalia
that the conflict between § 901(b) and Federal Rule 23 was
unavoidable.141 Although he acknowledged that a court should avoid an
unnecessary conflict between a Federal Rule and a state law, he argued
that, ―[s]imply because a rule should be read in light of federalism
concerns, it does not follow that courts may rewrite the rule.‖142
Justice Stevens, however, disagreed with Justice Scalia‘s
interpretation of the Sibbach case. Justice Stevens argued that Justice
137. Id. at 1444.
138. Id. at 1446.
139. Id. at 1445–46.
140. Id. at 1431, 1446 (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13–14). Justice Scalia also argued that his
approach was required by Sibbach—i.e., Sibbach‘s really regulates procedure test did not allow
consideration of state law and the test ―ha[d] been settled law . . . for nearly seven decades.‖ Id. at 1446.
Justice Stevens (and others) have made a compelling argument that Justice Scalia‘s broad interpretation
of Sibbach‘s really regulates procedure test is not required by Sibbach itself. See Ides, supra note 21.
Professor Ides points out that, for a variety of reasons, Sibbach did not argue that the right to be free
from a physical examination was substantive and made a only ―facial‖ challenge to the validity of
Federal Rule 35. Id. at 15. In light of these aspects of the Sibbach case, if one assumes that Justice
Scalia‘s interpretation of the really regulates procedure test is correct, the test ―provides at best a cryptic
and elliptical way of announcing a rather bold and superfluous interpretation of § 2072(b).‖ Id. For this
reason and others, Professor Ides has convincingly shown that the Sibbach really regulates procedure
test does not compel the result that Justice Scalia reaches in Shady Grove. Id. at 16 (―Thus, if the
question is one of statutory construction or stare decisis, Justice Stevens was plainly correct.‖).
141. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. Id.
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Scalia‘s application of the really regulates procedure test ―ignore[d] the
[Enabling Act‘s] . . . limitation that such rules . . . ‗not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.‘‖143 Where Justice Scalia argued that a
Federal Rule was valid if it ―really regulate[d] procedure,‖ Justice
Stevens argued that the procedural nature of a Federal Rule was only the
first requirement for validity under the Enabling Act.
Justice Stevens criticized the really regulates procedure approach for
valuing ease of application over fidelity to statutory text, stating that,
―[a]lthough Justice Scalia may generally prefer easily administrable,
bright-line rules, his preference does not give us license to adopt a
second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act‖; Justice Stevens
continued that ―[c]ourts cannot ignore text and context in the service of
simplicity.‖144
Justice Stevens read the Enabling Act to involve two requirements.
First, to be valid under § 2072(a), a rule must be a ―general rule[] of
practice [or] procedure.‖145 Second, to be valid under § 2072(b), the
rule must not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.146
Justice Stevens argued that the really regulates procedure approach only
spoke to § 2072(a) ―[b]ut it ignore[d] the second limitation that such
rules also ‗not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.‘‖147
Giving meaning to the Enabling Act‘s abridge, modify, or enlarge
limitation, Justice Stevens argued that a Federal Rule ―cannot govern a
particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is
procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a
state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the statecreated right.‖148 For brevity‘s sake, this Article will refer to this
approach as the ―intertwined‖ approach. Although noting that, ―[i]t will
be rare‖ that a state law will satisfy this intertwined approach,149 Justice
143. Id. at 1452–53.
144. Id. at 1454.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452–53 (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452–53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b)).
148. Id. at 1452.
149. Id. at 1454 n.10; id. at 1455 (―Although most state rules bearing on the litigation process are
adopted for some policy reason, few seemingly ‗procedural‘ rules define the scope of a substantive right
or remedy.‖).
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Stevens provided little additional guidance of the meaning of his test.
Justice Scalia characterized Justice Stevens‘ intertwined approach as
―inscrutable,‖150 arguing that Stevens‘ ―approach will present hundreds
of hard questions, forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or
procedural character of countless state rules that may conflict with a
single Federal Rule.‖151 As support, Justice Scalia pointed to Justice
Stevens‘ drawn out application of the intertwined approach in the Shady
Grove opinion itself, which required an examination of the legislative
history and context of § 901(b).152 According to Justice Stevens,
however, even if his approach was more difficult to apply, his ―inquiry
[wa]s what the Enabling Act requires.‖153
D. The “Deferential Interpretation” Approach
The disagreement between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens turned
on the meaning of the Enabling Act‘s ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖
limitation and the relative importance of an easily administrable rule
versus fidelity to statutory text. Justice Ginsburg, however, criticized
both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens for their answer to an antecedent
question: ―Is this conflict really necessary?‖154
Justice Ginsburg, with the support of three other justices, argued that
Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens were wrong in the interpretation of
Rule 23. In essence, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with Justice Scalia and
Justice Stevens on whether Rule 23 was ambiguous enough to allow
state interests to affect its interpretation. According to Justice Ginsburg,
the Court ―read[] Rule 23 relentlessly to override New York‘s restriction
on the availability of statutory damages.‖155 Justice Ginsburg argued
that the Court should interpret a Federal Rule with ―‗sensitivity to
important state interests to avoid conflict with important state regulatory
150. Id. at 1447 n.14 (plurality opinion).
151. Id. at 1447.
152. Id. at 1447 n.15 (internal citation omitted) (―Walking through the concurrence‘s application
of its test to § 901(b) gives little reason to hope that its approach will lighten the burden for lower
courts.‖).
153. Id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really
Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 (1959)).
155. Id.
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policies.‘‖156 For brevity‘s sake, this Article will refer to this as the
―deferential interpretation‖ approach.
Disputes over whether to apply state law or non-statutory federal law
only arise when application of one over the other would change the
outcome in a case—i.e., some difference between state law and federal
non-statutory law would cause a different result. (If the result were not
different, parties would have no motivation to argue for the application
of one over the other.) Resolution of these disputes depends on whether
the federal non-statutory law is judge made or a Federal Rule. When a
court limits the scope of a Federal Rule to avoid a conflict with a state
law, the conflict will not be governed by the Enabling Act. But even
with the Federal Rule thus limited, there is still an extant conflict
between the state law and some non-statutory federal law that is causing
a different outcome in federal court. This extant conflict must be
governed by the Erie analysis.
The deferential interpretation approach, therefore, allows a court to
resolve the conflict by reference to Erie‘s twin aims. The more flexible
Erie approach defers to the authority of state legislatures and values
federalism.157 According to Justice Ginsburg, the effect of a broad
interpretation of Rule 23 in Shady Grove was to undercut ―New York‘s
legitimate interest in keeping certain monetary awards reasonably
bounded.‖158
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens argued that Justice Ginsburg‘s
deferential interpretation approach would rewrite Federal Rule 23.159
Justice Scalia argued that the deferential interpretation approach was
actually counterproductive, stating that ―[t]he dissent‘s concern for state
prerogatives is frustrated rather than furthered by revising state laws
when a potential conflict with a Federal Rule arises; the state-friendly
approach would be to accept the law as written and test the validity of

156. Id. (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 438 n.22 (1996)).
157. Id. at 1464 (―Our decisions instruct over and over again that, in the adjudication of diversity
cases, state interests—whether advanced in a statute, or a procedural rule—warrant our respectful
consideration.‖) (internal citations omitted).
158. Id. at 1460.
159. Id. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (―We cannot contort [Rule 23‘s] text, even to avert a collision
with state law that might render it invalid.‖); id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―Simply because a
rule should be read in light of federalism concerns, it does not follow that courts may rewrite the rule.‖).
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the Federal Rule.‖160 Justice Stevens stated that, ―[a]t bottom, the
dissent‘s interpretation of Rule 23 seems to be that Rule 23 covers only
those cases in which its application would create no Erie problem.‖161
The three proposed approaches reflect the relative weight that the
justices assigned to the policy issues underlying the Shady Grove case:
Justice Scalia favored an approach that would be easily administrable,
Justice Stevens favored an approach that was most consistent with the
text of the Enabling Act, and Justice Ginsburg favored an approach that
was deferential to state legislatures.
E. After Shady Grove
As others have noted, Shady Grove solved almost nothing162: ―Shady
Grove‘s fractured opinions suggest the need to reconsider the problem
from the ground up.‖163 No opinion in Shady Grove garnered a majority
of five votes. Under the rule announced in Marks v. United States,
―[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices ‗the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.‘‖164
Following Shady Grove, most commentators and courts have
assumed that the ―narrowest‖ grounds was Justice Stevens‘ intertwined
approach.165 The Marks doctrine, however, is not always easy to
160. Id. at 1440 (plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
162. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 5.
163. Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 880.
164. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15 (1976)).
165. See Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Sorting out an Erie sequel, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 31, 2010,
1:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/analysis-sorting-out-an-erie-sequel/ (―Stevens‘ view on
this general point becomes controlling through the practice of the Court, when its nine members are
deeply divided, of treating the narrowest view supporting the outcome as the controlling interpretation,
in a legal sense.‖); McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 747 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (―Because
Justice Stevens‘ concurring opinion would permit some state law provisions addressing class actions—
whereas Justice Scalia‘s opinion in Part II-B (which only had the support of four Justices) would
broadly prohibit any state law that conflicted with Rule 23—Justice Stevens‘ opinion is the narrowest
and, thus, controlling opinion.‖); Estate of CA v. Grier, 752 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(―Justice Stevens's opinion, as the narrower opinion, controls.‖).
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apply166 and it is not clear that Justice Stevens‘ approach is the
narrowest, i.e., ―fit[s] entirely within a broader circle drawn by‖ Justice
Scalia.167 Even if courts do all agree that Justice Stevens‘ approach is
controlling, the meaning of Justice Stevens‘ approach is unclear. Justice
Stevens indicated that it would be ―rare‖ that ―a state law . . . [wa]s
procedural in the ordinary use of the term but [wa]s so intertwined with
a state right or remedy that it function[ed] to define the scope of the
state-created right.‖168 But Justice Stevens gave no examples of state
laws that would satisfy the intertwined approach.169
Further, although five members of the Court agreed that there was a
conflict between § 901(b) and Federal Rule 23, the extent to which
courts should shade the interpretation of a Federal Rule to avoid a
conflict remains unclear. Justice Scalia argued that the Court ―should
read an ambiguous Federal Rule to avoid ‗substantial variations [in
outcomes] between state and federal litigation . . . because it is
166. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) (―We think it not useful to pursue
the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the
lower courts that have considered [its application to Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)].‖).
167. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Courts have proposed several
definitions of ―narrowest.‖ See Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the
United States: A Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 97, 110–13 (2007) (describing several of the various definitions of ―narrowest‖ that have been
proposed). In King, the court has stated that the opinion is narrowest if it ―represent[s] a common
denominator of the Court‘s reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five
Justices who support the judgment.‖ King, 950 F.2d at 781. Further, the court noted that
―[w]hen . . . one opinion supporting the judgment does not fit entirely within the broader circle drawn by
the others, Marks is problematic.‖ Id. at 782. Further, ―[w]hen eight of nine Justices do not subscribe to
a given approach to a legal question, it surely cannot be proper to endow that approach with controlling
force, no matter how persuasive it may be.‖ Id. Another court has argued that the opinion is narrowest
that rests on the ground ―that is most nearly confined to the precise fact situation before the Court, rather
than to a ground that states more general rules.‖ United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 872–73 (1981).
168. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452, 1454 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
169. One possibility is that the ―intertwined‖ approach requires something roughly equivalent to
the ―bitter with the sweet‖ approach of the 1974 Supreme Court case Arnett v. Kennedy. Cf. 416 U.S.
134, 153–54 (1974) (―[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the
limitations on the procedure which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant . . . must take
the bitter with the sweet.‖). It should be noted that the ―bitter with the sweet‖ approach was later
rejected. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (―In light of these holdings, it is
settled that the ‗bitter with the sweet‘ approach misconceives the constitutional guarantee.‖). For
example, a procedural rule may be sufficiently ―intertwined‖ with a substantive right to violate the
Enabling Act when ―the very section of the statute which granted‖ the substantive right ―expressly
provided also for the procedure by which‖ the right should be enforced. Cf. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152.
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reasonable to assume that ‗Congress is just as concerned as we have
been to avoid significant differences between state and federal courts in
adjudicating claims.‘‖170 Although Justice Stevens agreed with Justice
Scalia that there was a conflict, he agreed with the dissent that a court
should ―avoid immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that
would trench on state prerogatives.‖171 The extent to which a court‘s
interpretation of a Federal Rule should be affected by a conflicting state
policy, therefore, is still very much unsettled.
Courts and litigants are left without guidance. This lack of guidance
creates a real need for an approach that can accommodate the various
policy interests that divided the Justices in Shady Grove. Below, this
Article will describe a new approach, referred to as the ―state-law
transsubstantivity‖ approach. After describing the approach, this Article
will demonstrate how the analysis would function in practice with
example cases.
IV. ―STATE-LAW TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY‖
Briefly summarized, the ―state-law transsubstantivity‖ approach is a
new solution to test whether application of a Federal Rule instead of a
conflicting state law would violate the Enabling Act‘s ―abridge, enlarge
or modify‖ limitation.172 Once a court determines that a state law and a
Federal Rule are in conflict, the court must examine the nature of the
state law to determine whether the state law is substantive or procedural.
This approach defines ―procedural‖ as ―transsubstantive‖ and defines
―substantive‖ as ―any law that lacks transsubstantivity.‖ If a state law is
not transsubstantive—i.e., if the state law only applies to a particular
170. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 n.7. Justice Scalia states that ―there is only one reasonable
reading of Rule 23‖ and that is in conflict with § 901(b). Id. But Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court
unnecessarily read into Rule 23 a conflict with § 901(b). Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―The
Court reads Rule 23 relentlessly to override New York's restriction on the availability of statutory
damages.‖).
171. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
172. This approach assumes that the federal rule in question will comply with § 2072(a)‘s
requirement that the federal rule is a ―general rule[] of practice [or] procedure.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)
(2006). This is the first and only step for testing the validity of a Federal Rule under Justice Scalia‘s
really regulates procedure approach. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1446 (noting the ―single hard
question of whether a Federal Rule regulates substance or procedure‖).
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type of claim—then the state law is presumed to create or define some
substantive right, such that a failure to apply the state law would
―abridge, enlarge or modify a[] substantive right.‖173 Conversely, if a
state law is transsubstantive—i.e., if a state law applies to all types of
claims—then the state law is procedural and the court should apply the
Federal Rule.
This approach would apply to Shady Grove as follows. Assuming
that in Shady Grove there was a conflict between § 901(b) and Federal
Rule 23, the Court should have proceeded to examine the nature of the
§ 901. Section 901(a) states that ―[o]ne or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all‖ if the class
meets certain prerequisites.174 Section 901(a) is transsubstantive and
applies to all claims; stated another way, all claims that meet the
prerequisites may be brought as a class action. Were the conflict in
Shady Grove between § 901(a) and Federal Rule 23, Federal Rule 23
would govern as § 901(a) is transsubstantive and purely procedural—
allowing a Federal Rule to trump a state procedural law is
unproblematic under the Enabling Act.175
But § 901(b), in contrast, plucks a particular type of claim out from
§ 901(a)‘s transsubstantive treatment and provides a special rule:
―Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure
of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in class action,
an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created
or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.‖176
Section 901(b), because it is not transsubstantive, is not purely
procedural; therefore, it is presumed to create or define some substantive

173. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
174. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(a) (McKinney 2006).
175. Not all possible statutes fall comfortably within the framework that I have proposed. Take,
for example, the following statute: ―Claims that do not seek statutory damages may proceed as a class
action if the claim meets certain prerequisites.‖ This hypothetical statute would be functionally identical
to the actual 901(a) and (b). This hypothetical statute is difficult to place within the framework that I
have proposed because it is essentially both transsubstantive (it creates a general rule applicable to all
claims) and not transsubstantive (it singles out a particular type of claim for special treatment at the
same time. In such a situation, it may be necessary to separate the part of a law that is transsubstantive
from the part of a law that is not transsubstantive.
176. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2006).
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right.177 Application of a Federal Rule that conflicts with § 901(b), will
thus abridge, enlarge, or modify178 a substantive right.
As argued above, the fractured result in Shady Grove was driven by
three different policy considerations at stake: (1) ease of administration,
(2) fidelity to the Enabling Act text, and (3) deference to important state
interests.
Below, this Article will explain how the state-law
transsubstantivity approach better accommodates all three of these
interests.
A. Ease of Administration
Justice Scalia‘s really regulates procedure approach involves only an
examination of whether the Federal Rule regulates procedure.179 This
approach is easy to administer because a court avoids examination of
―the idiosyncrasies of state law.‖180
Because the state-law transsubstantivity approach requires an
examination of state law, it arguably lacks the administrative ease of
Justice Scalia‘s really regulates procedure approach.
However,
determining whether a state law is transsubstantive—the only
examination of a state law required under the state-law
transsubstantivity approach—does not require an examination of
―idiosyncrasies‖181 or, potentially even more taxing on courts, an
examination of state legislative history.182 Justice Scalia‘s rejection of
an approach that examines the nature of the conflicting state law is
177. This point—that a law must be substantive if it is not purely procedural—is not an obvious
one but will be further developed infra Part III.B.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
179. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010)
(alterations in original) (quoting Miss. Publ‘g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)) (―What
matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it governs only ‗the manner and the means‘ by which the
litigants‘ rights are ‗enforced,‘ it is valid; if it alters ‗the rules of decision by which [the] court will
adjudicate [those] rights,‘ it is not.‖)).
180. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445; id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring) (criticizing the plurality
opinion and noting that, ―Although, Justice Scalia may generally prefer easily administrable, bright-line
rules, his preference does not give us license to adopt a second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling
Act. Courts cannot ignore text and context in the service of simplicity.‖).
181. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 (plurality opinion).
182. Cf. id. at 1441 (criticizing Justice Ginsburg‘s reliance on state legislative history to determine
the purpose of a state law).
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premised on the assumption that the examination will be taxing—i.e.,
determining the nature of a state law would present a ―hard
question[].‖183 If the examination of state law is simple, Justice Scalia‘s
criticism of any approach that examines state law is unpersuasive.184
Transsubstantivity is readily apparent. A law is transsubstantive ―if it
applies equally to all cases regardless of substance.‖ 185 When this is the
only relevant information about a state law, determining the ―nature‖ of
the state law is as simple as reading the law. Accordingly, although the
state-law transsubstantivity approach does require an examination of
state law, the additional burden this examination imposes on courts or
litigants is slight. The state-law transsubstantivity approach, therefore,
is not materially more difficult to administer than the really regulates
procedure approach.
B. Fidelity to the Enabling Act Text
Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia‘s really regulates procedure
approach as a ―second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act.‖186
Stevens argued that the really regulates procedure approach, by
precluding examination of the conflicting state law, ―ignore[d] the
[Enabling Act‘s] limitation that [a Federal Rule] ‗not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.‘‖187 As will be explained below, without
sacrificing ease of administration, the state-law transsubstantivity
approach is consistent with the language of the Enabling Act.

183. See id. at 1447 (criticizing Justice Stevens‘ ―intertwined‖ approach as ―present[ing] hundreds
of hard questions, forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or procedural character of countless
state rules that may conflict with a single Federal Rule‖).
184. There is a potential benefit from the uncertainty that this will cause—litigants will be limited
to the extent that they are able to forum shop. If a litigant does not know how a court will decide a
particular issue, a litigant cannot shop for that forum. But eliminating forum-shopping can be better
achieved with appropriate deference to state legislative judgments.
185. Marcus, supra note 23, at 376.
186. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 1452–53 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)) (emphasis removed).
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1. The Language of the Enabling Act Requires Consideration of the
Conflicting State Law
The phrase ―abridge, enlarge or modify‖ 188 requires a comparison. It
is not possible to know if a substantive right will be enlarged or
modified by a Federal Rule without first knowing the scope of that
substantive right. This language demands that a court examine the
scope of the substantive right embodied in the to-be displaced state law
to determine whether application of the Federal Rule will cause the right
to be abridged, enlarged, or modified. Justice Scalia all but admits that
this is the correct reading of the Enabling Act, acknowledging that ―it is
hard to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal Rule
‗abridges‘ or ‗modifies‘ substantive rights without knowing what statecreated rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not exist.‖189
Professor Allan Ides, however, has noted that, ―if one reads the phrase
‗really regulates procedure‘ in isolation, one can certainly construct an
argument that Sibbach melded the two requirements of the [Enabling
Act] into a single standard, one that focuses entirely on the procedural
character of the Federal Rule.‖190 The argument that Ides suggests
would require the following assumption: a rule that is procedural can
only actually conflict with other procedural rules. Under such an
assumption, once a Federal Rule is found to really regulate procedure,
any state law that conflicts with the Federal Rule must also be
procedural. Therefore, because the conflicting law is procedural,
allowing the Federal Rule to trump to the conflicting state law would not
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.
Although this argument is tenable, an argument can be made that the
structure of § 2072 indicates that Congress did not hold the critical
assumption.191 Specifically, if Congress believed that any state law
must be procedural when it conflicts with a Federal Rule that is
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
189. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445–46.
190. Ides, supra note 21, at 14.
191. It must also be noted that Professor Stephen Burbank has persuasively argued the Congress
did not intend the substance–procedure dichotomy to speak to a conflict between federal and state law.
Rather, Professor Burbank has argued that ―the procedure/substance dichotomy . . . was intended to
allocate lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress.‖ Stephen B.
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106 (1982).
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determined to be procedural, Congress would not have needed to
include § 2072(b)‘s ―abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right‖
language. The Enabling Act‘s text, then, suggests that the to-be
displaced state law must be examined.
2. Defining Procedural as Transsubstantive
The required examination of the to-be displaced state law must
determine whether the state law is substantive or procedural. The
Enabling Act vests the Supreme Court with authority to promulgate
general rules of practice and procedure but prohibits a Federal Rule
from ―abridge[ing], enlarge[ing] or modify[ing] any substantive
right.‖192 A Federal Rule that trumps a state procedural law is therefore
unproblematic under the Enabling Act.
Determining whether
application of a Federal Rule over a conflicting state law is problematic
under the Enabling Act requires a court to determine whether the
conflicting state law is substantive or procedural.193
a. Previous Attempts to Distinguish Between Substance and Procedure
Courts and commentators have struggled to find a line that separates
substance and procedure.194 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Sibbach,
even questioned whether substance and procedure ―are mutually
exclusive categories with easily ascertainable contents.‖ 195 Although

192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (emphasis added).
193. It should be noted, however, that some have questioned whether the Enabling Act actually
requires defining a law as substantive or procedural. See Bauer, supra note 4, at 31 (―[T]here is
something inherently problematic about having a result driven solely by a definitional label . . . rather
than by also undertaking some analysis of the legislative purpose behind the [Enabling Act], including
cabining the law-making role of the Supreme Court, and Congress‘ use of certain language to effect that
purpose.‖).
194. Historically, substance and procedure were joined together. See Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at
882 (―For centuries the Anglo-American tradition thoroughly integrated and interwove rules of
‗procedure‘ (understood to be the rules by which courts and other adjudicatory bodies resolve legal
disputes) and rules of ‗substance‘ (understood to be the rules to which citizens were supposed to
conform their conduct outside of the courtroom).‖).
195. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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this has proven to be a difficult task,196 categorizing a law as a
substantive or procedural is necessary because ―they are the terms that
Enabling Act uses.‖197
Past attempts at drawing the line between substance and procedure
have proved unworkable. Concurring in the Hanna case, Justice Harlan
suggested that a law was substantive if it ―affect[ed] those primary
decisions respecting human conduct.‖198 Roughly, this definition
suggests that a law is substantive if it affects matters outside of the court
and it is procedural if it affects matters at the courthouse door or once
inside.199 For example, a law that considers an individual a trespasser
(and therefore generally responsible for protecting his or her own safety)
when walking next to a railroad track will cause that individual to be
very careful on the path when a train approaches. 200 What an individual
does when walking on a path by a railroad track is easily conceived of as
―human conduct‖ and is, therefore, substantive.
This ―human conduct‖ definition would not solve all conflicts
between a state law and a Federal Rule. One example where the
definition fails is in its application to the bond requirement in the 1949
Supreme Court case Cohen v. Industrial Loan Corp.201 In Cohen, New
196. See Bauer, supra note 4, at 7–8 (―[E]ven after seventy-plus years, the Court has been unable
to come up with definitions of ‗procedural‘ and ‗substantive‘ which predictably resolve that
distinction.‖).
197. Ely, supra note 11, at 724. It should also be noted that ―substance‖ and ―procedure‖ do not
have intrinsic definitions that apply in all situations:
A particular issue may be classified as substantive or procedural in three contexts: when
determining whether it is within the scope of a court‘s rulemaking power; when resolving
questions of conflict of laws; or when determining whether to apply state law or federal law.
These three contexts present three very different kinds of problems, and factors that are of
decisive importance in making the substance-procedure classification for one context may be
irrelevant in the other contexts. To use the same terminology for all three contexts is an
invitation to a barren and misleading conceptualism, in which a decision classifying a particular
issue as substantive in one of these contexts could be misinterpreted to classify the issue as
substantive in another context even though an entirely different purpose is involved.
19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4508.
198. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
199. See Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 882 (noting that procedure is ―understood to be the rules by
which courts . . . resolve legal disputes‖ and that substance is ―understood to be the rules to which
citizens were supposed to conform their conduct outside of the courtroom‖).
200. Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69–70 (1938).
201. See Ely, supra note 11, at 729 (discussing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
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Jersey had enacted a statute requiring a plaintiff ―to post a bond securing
payment of defense costs‖ before instituting a shareholder derivative
suit.202 The Cohen Court held that this New Jersey statute did not
conflict with the applicable Federal Rule and, therefore, resolved the
conflict under the Erie framework.203 Concurring in Hanna, Justice
Harlan argued that even if there was a conflict, this New Jersey statute
―could be expected to have a substantial impact on private primary
activity‖ and ―reflected policy considerations which, under Erie, would
lie within the realm of state legislative authority.‖204 Justice Harlan
failed to identify how to determine when a law lies within the nebulous
―realm of state legislative authority.‖205 Notably, although stating that
Cohen would have been the correct result even if the New Jersey law
and the Federal Rule had conflicted, Justice Harlan did not characterize
the New Jersey law as ―substantive.‖206
Although the ―human conduct‖ definition is conceptually helpful, it
does not adequately solve the Enabling Act problem. Instead, the
human conduct definition relies on the ―realm of state legislative
authority‖ to capture those results that the definition cannot.
Following the Hanna opinion, Professor Ely came closer to a
workable definition of substance and procedure.207 Professor Ely
proffered that a right is substantive when it is granted ―for one or more
nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do
with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.‖208 This
541 (1949)).
202. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 477.
203. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556.
204. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan first noted that the Cohen case
was not decided under the Enabling Act analysis because the Cohen Court had interpreted Rule 23 to
avoid a conflict with the New Jersey statute. Id. Harlan continued, noting that ―even had even had the
Federal Rules purported to do so, and in so doing provided a substantially less effective deterrent to
strike suits, I think the state rule should still have prevailed.‖ Id.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 477–78.
207. Ely, supra note 11.
208. Ely, supra note 11, at 725. Professor Ely also pointed out that ―it is not at all unlikely that
with respect to a given rule the legislature or other rulemaker will have had two (or more) goals in
mind—one relating to the management of litigation and one relating to some other concern.‖ Id. at 726;
see also Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 64 (―No one doubts that procedures may be designed—for
substantive policy reasons—to make it easier in a close case for one side to prevail.‖). It has long been
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definition was able to accommodate the result in Cohen—even though
the effect of the bond statute in Cohen was to halt litigation before it
started, this was ―done for a substantive purpose.‖209
This definition also adequately explained how to treat a statute of
limitations. A statute of limitations is a ―‗door closing‘ rule[]‖210 and is
limited to conduct that occurs at the courthouse door. Statutes of
limitations seem primarily directed at influencing litigation conduct
more than human conduct—i.e., it influences someone to file a suit by a
particular time. Professor Ely has pointed out, however, that a statute of
limitations also allows ―potential defendants to breathe easy after the
passage of the designated period‖ and that this ―purpose[] . . . cannot be
dismissed as procedural.‖211
So, Professor Ely‘s definition actually provided a line between
substance and procedure because it included laws with substantive
purposes within the substantive category.212 Professor Ely, however,
failed to provide a workable way to determine when a law had been
enacted for a substantive purpose. According to Ely, the Supreme Court
reached the correct result in Hanna, which allowed Federal Rule 4(d)(1)
to trump a state law that required in-hand service for a case involving an
executor of an estate. Ely argued that this was correct because ―the state
rule thus subordinated was one concerned with assuring actual notice
recognized that a procedural-looking law can be substantive: ―The 1926 Senate Judiciary Committee
noted that ‗some of our most valued civil liberties have been obtained through the creation by legislative
edict of mere remedial measures.‘‖ Burbank & Wolff, supra note 5, at 47. ―Congress has learned the
power of procedure and knows how to pursue or mask substantive aims in procedural dress.‖ Id. at 51.
One commentator has suggested a definition that attempts to combine the principles expressed in
Harlan‘s concurrence and expressed by Professor Ely: ―a rule is substantive in this context—not subject
to displacement by an Enabling Act rule—(a) if it has a nonprocedural purposes, or (b) even if its
purposes are entirely procedural, if it is calculated to affect behavior at the planning as distinguished
from the disputative stage of activity.‖ Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and
Application of State Law in Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 404 (1977)
209. Ely, supra note 11, at 729.
210. See id. at 732.
211. See id. at 730–31.
212. A contrary rule would violate principles of federalism. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1450 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (―In our federalist
system, Congress has not mandated that federal courts dictate to state legislatures the form that their
substantive law must take. And were federal courts to ignore those portions of substantive state law that
operate as procedural devices, it would in many instances limit the ways that sovereign States may
define their rights and remedies.‖).
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and therefore a fair opportunity to appear and be heard.‖213 But how
does one know that the purpose of the displaced state law was only
notice and a fair opportunity to be heard? The First Circuit, before the
matter was appealed to the Supreme Court, had concluded that the
service of process rule was ―a substantive rather than a procedural
matter.‖214 As noted by the First Circuit, this Massachusetts service of
process rule was a part of a ―[s]pecial statute[] of limitations to
effectuate the safe and ‗speedy settlement of estates that the heirs might
be quieted.‘‖215 This stark disagreement demonstrates the difficulty in
reliably determining whether a state law has a substantive purpose.
b. Finding the Purpose of the To-Be Displaced State Law
The concept of transsubstantivity can be used as a tool to reliably
determine when a law has a substantive purpose. In the Enabling Act
universe, a state law can be three things: (1) substantive, (2) procedural,
or (3) both substantive and procedural.216
The state-law
transsubstantivity approach begins distinguishing between substance and
procedure by identifying what is purely procedural—i.e., that which can
be characterized as procedural and nothing else. A law that is
transsubstantive speaks only to matters of procedure; the law does not
213. Ely, supra note 11, at 732. Even Professor Ely recognized that Massachusetts‘ service-ofprocess rule could be thought of as a substantive in the same way that a statute of limitations was
substantive: ―There is, of course, a sense in which one will ‗breathe easier‘ simply by virtue of the
assurance that the state is making a special effort to ensure that notice of suit will not get lost.‖ Id. at
732.
214. Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964).
215. Id. (quoting Brown v. Anderson, 13 Mass. 201, 202 (1816)).
216. Following Shady Grove, Professor Tidmarsh published a fascinating article suggesting a
complete reformulation of Erie and the Enabling Act. See Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 880. The author
reads Professor Tidmarsh to confront the Enabling Act problem from the opposite direction—i.e.,
Professor Tidmarsh tries to distill a law down to its substantive essence. Id. He explains his approach
as follows:
In brief, if we assume a world in which processing a state-law claim from filing through
settlement or judgment is costless and outcome-neutral, the claim has an expected value at the
time of its hypothetical filing in a state court. This value is a product of the probability of
recovery and the amount of the remedy if liability is found. What a federal court cannot do—
whether its choice involves a Federal Rule or a common-law procedural rule—is to choose a rule
that affects this expected value.
Id. at 880–81.
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speak to any substantive matter.
This is not to say that a
transsubstantive law is value-neutral.217 But a transsubstantive rule is
concerned only with matters of ―mak[ing] the process of litigation a fair
and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes.‖218 There can be
no substantive purpose in a law that does not address any particular type
of substantive claim. A law that is transsubstantive, therefore, is purely
procedural. A law that is purely procedural and can reliably be placed
within the procedural category. A court‘s application of a Federal Rule
to trump such a law is therefore unproblematic under the Enabling Act.
The state-law transsubstantivity approach then presumes that, of the
three types of laws in the Enabling Act universe (substantive,
procedural, or substantive and procedural), only transsubstantive laws
can fall within the procedural type.
Any law that lacks
transsubstantivity must create or define some substantive right. The
foundation for this approach is the assumption that when a state
legislature is not speaking purely about procedure, it is speaking about
substance. And when a state legislature is speaking about substance, the
legislature has at least some substantive purpose for enacting the law.
This presumption is not inexorable—i.e., this presumption does not
inevitably flow from the idea that a transsubstantive law is purely
procedural.219 Specifically, it is possible that a legislature may enact a
state law that lacks transsubstantivity for purely procedural reasons. For
example, in Shady Grove, Justice Stevens suggests that § 901(b) can be
read as a ―procedural calibration of making it easier to litigate claims in
217. Marcus, supra note 23, at 379–80.
218. Ely, supra note 11, at 724.
219. Certainly the Constitution does not require adopting this definition of substance and
procedure. It seems likely that Congress has the authority to declare the rule announced by Justice
Scalia—i.e., a Federal Rule will govern in federal courts regardless of the state law that it trumps. See
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (2010) (―[I]t is not the
substantive or procedural nature of the affected state law that matters, but that of the Federal Rule.‖);
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted)
(―The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over
procedure. The [Article Three] and the ―necessary and proper‖ clause of Article One may fully authorize
legislation, such as this section of the Judiciary Act.‖); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)
(―[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those
courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain
area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.‖).
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New York courts (under any source of law) only when it is necessary to
do so, and not making it too easy when the class tool is not required.‖220
It is therefore possible to imagine a law that lacks transsubstantivity as
having only a procedural purpose.221
Justice Stevens, in fact, in his intertwined approach, essentially
proposes his own presumption. For Justice Stevens, when a state law
and a Federal Rule are in conflict, application of the Federal Rule is
unproblematic (i.e., the state law is procedural) unless there is ―little
doubt‖ that state law is substantive.222
Both the state-law transsubstantivity approach and Justice Stevens‘
approach, then, rely on presumptions. The presumption underlying the
220. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring).
221. It is also possible to imagine a transsubstantive law that has a substantive purpose. For
example, imagine a state that has enacted a transsubstantive statute of limitations as State Law § 1: ―All
claims must be commenced within two years of the cause of action‘s accrual.‖ (It is hard to imagine this
happening and the author is not aware of any state that has done this. Statutes of limitations generally
fix a time limit because of the facts that typically come up in that type of cause of action. So, for
example, a personal injury statute of limitations may be shorter than a contract statute of limitations.)
Then, the Supreme Court promulgated a hypothetical Federal Rule 87: ―All claims must be commenced
within one year of the cause of action‘s accrual.‖ These two statutes conflict, and allowing the Federal
Rule 87 to trump State Law § 1 would seem to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right. The
state-law transsubstantivity approach would require application of the Federal Rule 87 over State Law
§ 1 because State Law § 1 is transsubstantive. Importantly, however, the state-law transsubstantivity
approach is designed only to solve the Enabling Act problem in Shady Grove—i.e., how does a court
distinguish between substantive and procedural for the purposes of the Enabling Act‘s abridge, enlarge,
or modify limitation on the Supreme Court‘s rulemaking authority? In the hypothetical conflict between
Federal Rule 87 and State Law § 1, the abridge, enlarge, or modify may never come up. This is because
the Enabling Act, in § 2072(a), grants the Supreme Court with authority only to promulgate ―general
rules of practice and procedure‖—a federal statute of limitations may not be a rule of practice or
procedure but instead a definition of substantive rights. The workable distinction between ―substantive‖
and ―procedural‖ proposed here is only meant to apply to the language in § 2072(b). The notion that
§ 2072(a) should handle this hypothetical conflict in some ways just avoids a hard question—when does
a law that appears transsubstantive actually have a substantive purpose? But it seems that this question
would only rarely arise and its difficulty does not wholly undercut the administrative simplicity of the
state-law transsubstantivity approach.
222. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens states that it will
be ―rare‖ that a conflicting state law will satisfy this test. Id. at 1454 n.10 (citations omitted) (―It will be
rare that a federal rule that is facially valid under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 will displace a State's definition of
its own substantive rights.‖). He also states that ―the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high
one.‖ Id. at 1457. Justice Stevens also assumes that when a state law conflicts when a Federal Rule, the
state law will typically look procedural. See id. at 1457 (―The mere fact that a state law is designed as a
procedural rule suggests it reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to operate and not a
judgment about the scope of state-created rights and remedies.‖).
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state-law transsubstantivity approach (that a state law that lacks
transsubstantivity must create or define some substantive right) is
preferable for two reasons.
First, there is nothing in the Enabling Act that compels or even
suggests Justice Stevens‘ ―little doubt‖ approach. Instead, the Enabling
Act categorically prohibits ―abridg[ing], enlarg[ing] or modify[ing] any
substantive right.‖223 The Enabling Act‘s ―any substantive right‖
language should mean ―any substantive right,‖ regardless of how a state
legislature has chosen to grant that substantive right. 224 Justice Stevens
acknowledged that it was ―plausible‖ that New York adopted § 901(b)
because the state ―wished to create a ‗limitation‘ on New York‘s
‗statutory damages,‘‖225 which would be a substantive purpose. Even
so, Justice Stevens concludes that § 901(b) should be treated as
procedural because ―there are costs involved in attempting to discover
the true nature of a state procedural rule.‖226
Second, the Enabling Act is the result of Congress‘s judgment about
when it is proper to delegate authority to another coequal branch of the
federal government, the Supreme Court, and the boundaries of that
delegation. The Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence on congressional limits
imposed on subject-matter jurisdiction can be instructive here. Subjectmatter jurisdiction ―concerns the fundamental constitutional question of
the allocation of judicial power between the federal and state
governments.‖227 The Supreme Court has cautioned that federal courts
must assiduously observe congressional limits on jurisdiction.228
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
224. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1450 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―[W]ere federal courts to
ignore those portions of substantive state law that operate as procedural devices, it could in many
instances limit the ways that sovereign States may define their rights and remedies.‖).
225. Id. at 1457. Justice Stevens, in his analysis of § 901(b) under the ―intertwined‖ approach
stated that ―there [we]re two plausible competing narratives‖ about the purpose of § 901(b). Id. at 1459.
226. Id. at 1457 (―And for the purposes of operating a federal court system, there are costs
involved in attempting to discover the true nature of a state procedural rule and allowing such a rule to
operate alongside a federal rule that appears to govern the same question. The mere possibility that a
federal rule would alter a state-created right is not sufficient. There must be little doubt.‖).
227. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D.
FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (3d ed. 2008).
228. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
(―Subject-matter jurisdiction, then, is an Art. III as well as a statutory requirement; it functions as a
restriction on federal power, and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign. Certain
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Similarly, the Enabling Act is a limitation imposed by Congress on the
authority of the Supreme Court. The Enabling Act limitation on the
Supreme Court‘s authority should, therefore, similarly be assiduously
observed. In other words, Justice Stevens permits room for error on the
wrong side of the issue.
The language in the Enabling Act, in light of the Supreme Court‘s
traditional observance of congressional limitations on the Supreme
Court‘s power, supports the state-law transsubstantivity presumption.
Unless a court can conclude that a law is procedural within the Enabling
Act universe, the law is either substantive or ostensibly procedural with
a substantive purpose.229 The argument here is not that this is the only
conceivable way to apply the Enabling Act‘s ―abridge, enlarge or
modify‖ limitation; rather, the argument here is only that this
presumption better carries out the Enabling Act.
C. Deference to Important State Interests
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, argued that the Court ―relentlessly‖
read Federal Rule 23 to override important state interests.230 According
to Justice Ginsburg, the majority ―approve[d] Shady Grove‘s attempt to
transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award, although the State

legal consequences directly follow from this. For example, no action of the parties can confer subjectmatter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant, California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), principles of estoppel do not apply, Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341
U.S. 6, 17–18 (1951), and a party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction
early in the proceedings.‖).
229. Whether this presumption should be rebuttable is a question that should be saved for a state
law that presents such an issue. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536
(1958). In Byrd, the Court faced the question whether the South Carolina practice of having a judge
(rather than a jury) determine factual issues associated with the workers-compensation bar to tort suits
was ―a rule intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties.‖ Id.
The Court concluded that it was not, stating, ―[the practice] is grounded in the practical consideration
that the question had therefore come before the South Carolina courts from the Industrial Commission
and the courts had become accustomed to deciding the factual issue of immunity without the aid of
juries.‖ Id. Byrd is arguably different because the non-transsubstantive practice established in that case
was established by courts and not the legislature. This is not to say that rule pronounced by a state court
do not qualify as state law, but only to suggest that the process for adopting a common law practice in a
state court may be so different than legislation that the presumption does not hold up.
230. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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creating the right to recover has proscribed this alchemy.‖ 231
Unlike Justice Scalia‘s and Justice Stevens‘ approaches, the state-law
transsubstantivity approach would defer to state policy judgments
directed at anything other than the simple efficiency of courts.232 When
a state legislature selects a particular substantive claim for special
treatment, a federal court sitting in diversity would be required to give
that particular substantive claim the same special treatment afforded in
This approach, therefore, accommodates Justice
state court.233
Ginsburg‘s concern for deference to important state interests.
In its deference to state legislatures, the state-law transsubstantivity
approach should have the added benefit of helping to resolve the
disagreement in Shady Grove (the Court split five to four) on whether
§ 901(b) and Federal Rule 23 were in conflict. Justice Scalia argued
that, to determine whether a conflict exists, a court must determine
whether the state law and the Federal Rule both supply an answer to the
―question in dispute.‖234 According to Justice Scalia, under the only
reasonable interpretation, Federal Rule 23 conflicted with New York‘s
§ 901(b).235 Justice Ginsburg called Justice Scalia‘s interpretation
231. Id.
232. Cf. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4504 (summarizing the Hanna opinion‘s really
regulates procedure test and raising the question, ―But has the pendulum swung too far?‖); id. § 4509
(noting that the Sibbach test ―is no test at all—in a sense, it is little more than the statement that a matter
is procedural if, by revelation, it is procedural‖).
233. There are hypothetical state statutes that would seem to test the notion that federal courts
should defer to state legislatures when a particular claim is singled out for special treatment. Take, for
example, a state statute that required that different colored covers be used for filings in different kinds of
cases (e.g., red for contract/tort cases; blue for civil rights cases; etc.). Such a statute would be
nontransubstantive, but it would seem like statute that is really directed at the efficient prosecution of
claims, rather than substantive rights. Under the state-law transsubstantivity approach however, a
federal court would be required to follow such a state law. Such a result seems problematic; after all,
the color of a cover sheet for a civil case seems fairly trivial. But one of the points of the state-law
transsubstantivity is to avoid normative judgments about the triviality or importance of a conflicting
state law. However, to the extent that a state statute would impose unduly taxing administrative burdens
on federal courts, it may be necessary to include some sort of constitutional backstop on the power of a
state legislature to impose the applicable of procedures in federal courts. See infra note 246 and
accompanying text.
234. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 (―We must first determine whether Rule 23 answers the
question in dispute . . . . The question in dispute is whether Shady Grove‘s suit may proceed as a class
action. Rule 23 provides an answer. . . . [Section] 901(b) attempts to answer the same question . . . .
[Rule 23 and § 901(b)] flatly contradict each other.‖).
235. Id. at 1441 n.7 (―[T]here is only one reasonable reading of Rule 23.‖).
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―relentless[]‖ and ―mechanical.‖236
The disagreement between Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg on this
issue was driven by a disagreement on how much the policies
underlying Erie should influence the interpretation of the scope of a
Federal Rule.237 Justice Scalia argued that the Court ―should read an
ambiguous Federal Rule to avoid ‗substantial variations [in outcomes]
between state and federal litigation.‘‖238 Justice Ginsburg, on the other
hand, stated that a Federal Rule should be interpreted ―‗with sensitivity
to important state interests‘ and a will ‗to avoid conflict with important
state regulatory policies.‘‖239 Justice Ginsburg seemed to put a heavier
thumb on the no-conflict side of the scale when interpreting a Federal
Rule.240 Although defining conflict is not the function of the state-law
transsubstantivity approach, divorcing the consideration of important
state policy considerations from the interpretation of the Federal Rules
may help to bring more consistency to the interpretation of the Rules.241
Despite these benefits, an argument can be made that the state-law
transsubstantivity approach is too deferential to state interests. In
rejecting Justice Stevens‘ intertwined approach, Justice Scalia argued
that Justice Stevens‘ approach could allow states too much influence on
procedure in federal courts. Too much deference would ―allow States to
force a wide array of parochial procedures on federal courts.‖ 242 The
state-law transsubstantivity approach is, arguably, even more susceptible

236. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
237. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
238. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 n.7. Justice Scalia states that ―there is only one reasonable
reading of Rule 23‖ and that is in conflict with § 901(b). Id. Justice Ginsburg, on the other hand,
argued that the Court unnecessarily read into Rule 23 a conflict with § 901(b). Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (―The Court reads Rule 23 relentlessly to override New York's restriction on the availability
of statutory damages.‖).
239. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463 (citations omitted).
240. This strong disagreement is unsurprising given the Supreme Court‘s inconsistent
interpretation of the Federal Rules in Enabling Act cases. See Freer & Arthur, supra note 22, at 70
(―Through the years, the Court has been anything but consistent in its approach to the important
funneling function of assessing the breadth of a Federal Rule.‖).
241. In addressing examples of the application of the state-law transsubstantivity approach, this
Article will apply Justice Scalia‘s question in dispute approach.
242. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1446 n.11. Cf. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4504
(noting that the outcome-determinative test of York was criticized because ―[a]pplied literally, very little
would have remained of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity cases‖).
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to this criticism than Justice Stevens‘ intertwined approach.243
Addressing this criticism is best done with an example. Imagine that
a state passed the hypothetical State Law § 2: ―No claim for injuries
caused by negligent operation of a motor vehicle can be dismissed
before a full trial on the merits.‖ This law lacks transsubstantivity and,
therefore, would be categorized as an ostensibly procedural law with a
substantive purpose. Assuming that this law would conflict with the
several Federal Rules that allow for dismissal of an action before trial
(Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 56), a federal court sitting in diversity
would be required to apply State Law § 2.
Application of State Law § 2 would require a federal court to forego
two of the traditional tools for efficiently screening out unmeritorious
claims before trial. An approach that allows a state legislature this much
control over federal courts seems problematic.244 But why?245 If a state
243. The comparison with the ―deferential interpretation‖ approach is somewhat more
complicated. The ―deferential interpretation‖ approach would only apply a state procedural law when
the failure to apply the state procedural law would be problematic under Erie‘s twin aims. Some cases
reasonably involving a conflict between a federal rule and a state law that is not transsubstantive may
nonetheless apply the federal rule because the state law does not pose any problem under the traditional
Erie analysis. In this narrow class of cases, however, the state rule would apply under the ―state-law
transsubstantivity‖ approach. The ―state-law transsubstantivity‖ approach would also, potentially, apply
the federal rule in some cases when the ―deferential interpretation‖ approach would apply the state rule.
If, for example, the failure to apply a conflicting and transsubstantive state rule would cause an Erie
problem, the ―deferential interpretation‖ approach would apply the state law and the ―state-law
transsubstantivity‖ approach would apply the federal rule.
244. There certainly are federal interests at stake. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 4501
(noting the difficulty in ―reconciling the tension between Erie‘s command that federal courts must honor
state substantive law when it is applicable[] and the integrity of the federal courts as an independent
judicial system‖). Once the federal judicial system affords a federal forum to certain kinds of litigation,
including cases based on the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the federal courts have an interest in
uniformity of the procedure used in every federal court for the various stages of the litigation, because
uniformity helps the parties, attorneys and judges know what the rules are. See Bauer, supra note 4, at
22–23. Uniformity in turn also leads to greater ease of administration of the judicial process; federal
courts will have to look to fewer sources for resolving controverted issues, and they will be sources with
which the courts are more familiar. Id. Differing state procedural requirements also might compel
federal courts to create unique mechanisms to accommodate them. Federal courts also have an interest
in docket control, including deciding which cases will continue, and in what form, and what actions
should be terminated, and when, and under what standards. Finally, in diversity cases, federal courts
have an interest in providing a forum that is, or is perceived to be, less biased against out-of-state
litigants.
245. Cf. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (―[T]he intent [of Erie] was to insure
that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of
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has made a judgment to require that all claims for negligent operation of
a motor vehicle go to trial for the substantive purpose of guaranteeing its
citizens the right to drive in a safe environment, is it up to a federal
district court to decide that the state legislature is incorrect? A refusal to
apply State Law § 2 in federal courts would implicate Erie‘s twin aims,
which, at bottom, are focused on fairness.
At some point, an unduly burdensome state law might run up against
―the Constitution‘s grant of power over federal procedure‖246 to the
federal government, but this is not a reason to reject the state-law
transsubstantivity approach. That a state would pass such a burdensome
law seems unlikely. States generally face the same pressures of
overworked and overburdened courts that the federal government faces.
Even if there exists some possibility that a future case would be
problematic, this remote possibility does not make untenable the statelaw transsubstantivity approach.
V. APPLICATION OF THE STATE-LAW TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY APPROACH IN
PRACTICE
Several example cases will help demonstrate how the state-law
transsubstantivity approach would work in practice.
A. Service of Process
As discussed above, in Hanna, the Court was faced with the decision
between a Massachusetts General Law ch. 197 § 9 (which required inhand service for a case involving an executor)247 and Federal Rule
citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the
same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.‖).
246. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (―To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be
to disembowel either the Constitution‘s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress‘ attempt to
exercise that power in the Enabling Act. Rule 4(d)(1) is valid and controls the instant case.‖).
247. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958) (―Except as provided in this chapter, an
executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is
not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to
such an action which is commenced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such
action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or service thereof
accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the creditor, the

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

47

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

48

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

4(d)(1) (which allowed service of process at a defendant‘s house).248 In
the Hanna case, service of process was purportedly made when
Plumer‘s wife received the complaint and summons at Plumer‘s
house.249
Plumer later moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hanna could
not maintain her case because Plumer had not been served in-hand as
required by Massachusetts.250 The question in dispute in Hanna was
whether Plumer had been properly served.
Because both the
Massachusetts law and the Federal Rule 4(d)(1) answered the same
question in dispute, there was a conflict.251
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing the Hanna case before the
Supreme Court, had stated that the law was actually designed to ensure
that heirs would be quieted:
[I]n addition to service sufficient to satisfy due process requirements for
in personam jurisdiction, the executor, a creature of the Massachusetts
court charged with the administration and disposition of the estate sought
to be reached, was by law entitled to receive specific notification of the
action within the year. Special statutes of limitations to effectuate the
safe and speedy settlement of estates that the heirs might be quieted have
been operative in the Commonwealth for over 150 years. Relatively
recent amendments evince a clear legislative purpose to require personal
notification within the year, ascertainable of record. This matter is quite
apart from the question of what is adequate service of process in the
procedural sense. Actual, record notice would appear fully as substantive
a state requirement binding in the federal court as is a requirement that in
certain actions a bond must be furnished for costs.252

The Supreme Court, with almost no analysis, reversed this judgment
of the First Circuit and held that ―Rule 4(d)(1) is valid and controls the
amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper
registry of probate . . . .‖).
248. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461 (―[S]ervice was made by leaving copies of the summons and the
complaint with respondent‘s wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4(d)(1).‖).
249. Id. at 461.
250. Id. at 462–63.
251. Cf. id. at 470 (noting that the conflict in Hanna was ―unavoidable‖ and distinguishing other
cases where the purportedly conflicting Federal Rule did not ―cover[] the point in dispute‖).
252. Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
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instant case.‖253 The Court reasoned that ―[t]o hold that a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of
enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the
Constitution‘s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress‘
attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.‖254
Under the state-law transsubstantivity approach, after finding a
conflict, the court should have whether the state law was purely
procedural—i.e., transsubstantive—to determine if application of the
Federal Rule would violate the Enabling Act.
The Massachusetts law was not transsubstantive. The law only
applied to a claim by a creditor against an executor or administrator.255
It was not purely procedural and, therefore, would have been presumed
to have at least some substantive purpose. The state law, therefore,
embodied a protection on a creditor and the heirs of an estate.
This conclusion makes sense, too. Hanna had sued Plumer for
injuries that Plumer did not cause. Plumer was the executor of the estate
of the person that injured Hanna. An executor is ―a creature of the
Massachusetts court charged with the administration and disposition of
the estate sought to be reached.‖256 Massachusetts, by creating this
institution should be able to control exactly what it should and should
not be entitled to receive because the purpose of this institution was to
ensure a ―safe and ‗speedy settlement of estates that the heirs might be
quieted.‘‖257 Massachusetts was apparently concerned that heirs be able
to breathe easy and know the disposition of an estate after one year was
final. It is not the place for the Supreme Court to second guess this
decision.258

253. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474.
254. Id. at 473–74.
255. Id. at 461–62.
256. Hanna, 331 F.2d at 159.
257. Id. at 159 (quoting Brown v. Anderson, 13 Mass. 201, 202 (1816)).
258. Cf. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469 (―Moreover, it is difficult to argue that permitting service of
defendant‘s wife to take the place of in-hand service of defendant himself alters the mode of
enforcement of state-created rights in a fashion sufficiently ‗substantial‘ to raise the sort of equal
protection problems to which the Erie opinion alluded.‖).
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B. Pleading Standards
There has been much debate about how much (and even whether) the
Twombly and Iqbal cases changed pleading standards in federal court.259
Assuming, however, that the cases have heightened pleading standards a
perceptible amount, and that this change will make a difference in some
cases, it can be argued that Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is in conflict with a
state rule 12(b)(6) that has not adopted the Twombly and Iqbal gloss.
For example, in 2010, the Supreme Court of Washington expressly
―decline[d]‖ to adopt the Twombly and Iqbal gloss on the motion to
dismiss because it had not been presented with ―the type of facts and
figures (specific to the Washington trial courts) that were presented to,
and persuaded, the United States Supreme Court to alter its
interpretation‖ of the motion to dismiss.260
For a case brought in a federal district court that sits in Washington
State, there is an argument (on the above assumptions) that the federal
court should apply Washington‘s rule on the motion to dismiss. Both
rules would answer the same question—whether the plaintiff had stated
a claim. To determine how to resolve that conflict, a court would
examine the nature of the conflicting state law.
Washington Civil Rule 12(b)(6) states that:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
259. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010); Edward A.
Hartnett, Taming Twombly Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010). The Twombly and Iqbal
cases, however, only explicitly apply to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and do not govern any
state rule on a motion to dismiss. In Conley v. Gibson, a seminal case on pleading standards in federal
court, the Supreme Court had stated that ―a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.‖ Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). In Twombly, the Supreme Court
stated that this ―no set of facts‖ language ―ha[d] earned its retirement.‖ Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 563 (2007). Restating the test for a motion to dismiss, the Twombly Court stated that a
plaintiff must plead ―enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its fact.‖ Id. at 570.
260. McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, 233 P.3d 861, 863–64 (Wash. 2010); see also Roger
Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things To Come: The Great Split Between Federal and State Pleading
Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/10/27/michalski.html.
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granted . . . .261

This rule applies to ―a claim for relief in any pleading‖ and is
therefore transsubstantive.262 Because this rule is transsubstantive,
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) (and the Twombly and Iqbal gloss) would govern
a motion to dismiss in a federal district court sitting in Washington state
under the ―state-law transsubstantivity‖ approach.263
A rule on a motion to dismiss applicable to all cases does not reflect
how a substantive right is protected. Instead it governs purely how it is
enforced in a court. This hypothetical case demonstrates that, under the
state-law transsubstantivity approach, the Federal Rules are not
―disembowel[ed],‖264 but will trump conflicting state laws that are
purely procedural.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, under the state-law transsubstantivity approach, when a
Federal Rule conflicts with a state law, a court should examine the
nature of the state law to determine whether the state law is
transsubstantive. If the state law is not transsubstantive, the court
should presume that the state law protects some substantive right.
Application of the Federal Rule over the conflicting state law that is not
transubstantive, therefore, would abridge, enlarge, or modify a
substantive right in violation of the Enabling Act.265
Because
application of the Federal Rule would violate the Enabling Act, the
Federal Rule must yield to the conflicting state law.
The state-law transsubstantivity approach outlined here provides a
rule that will accommodate the various policy interests that divided the
Justices in Shady Grove: the approach is easily administrable and will
261. WASH. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
262. If the Washington Supreme Court interpreted this transsubstantive Civil Rule 12(b)(6) to
require heightened pleading in employment discrimination cases, the Washington Supreme Court gloss
would be substantive under this state-law transsubstantivity approach. This is because such gloss would
not be gloss at all but instead a common law substantive rule that is applicable to a particular type of
claim that a federal court would be required to follow.
263. But see Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine (And What Does It Mean for the
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008).
264. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
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not require federal courts to delve into state legislative history, 266 the
approach does not write language out of the Enabling Act,267 and the
approach gives deference to judgments made by state legislatures about
substantive rights.268

266. Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1441 (2010).
(criticizing the ―deferential interpretation‖ approach for requiring federal judges to ―por[e] through state
legislative history‖); id. at 1447 n.14 (criticizing the ―intertwined‖ approach as ―inscrutable‖ and as
―forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or procedural character of countless state rules that may
conflict with a single Federal Rule‖).
267. Cf. id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring) (criticizing the really regulates procedure approach
for ―ignor[ing] text and context in the service of simplicity‖).
268. Cf. id. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for a ―mechanical reading of
Federal Rules [that was] insensitive to state interests and productive of discord‖).
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